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PREFACE 
 
his CEPS Working Party was launched for the purpose of offering input to the 
discussions related to the European Commission’s Green Paper of N ovember 2000, 
Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, which has initiated a 
very timely debate on an important issue of European concern. 
The point of departure of the CEPS Working Party was that the rapidly changing economic 
environment in which the energy sector operates calls for new concepts and policies to deal with 
security of supply. Liberalisation of energy markets, the completion of the EU’s internal market, 
growing global economic interdependency and competitive pressures stemming from 
globalisation increasingly call into question the utility of traditional approaches. These 
approaches, which have relied predominantly on national responses, driven by governments and 
with a focus on physical availability of energy, increasingly have to be replaced by an economic 
risk-management strategy in which responsibility is shared between the EU, member states, 
energy companies and customers. In addition, the emerging international climate change regime 
will lead to a reassessment of fuel choice.  
The CEPS Working Party met four times between June and October 2001. The objective was to 
bring together the decision-makers from the EU institutions and the stakeholders – including 
business, industry and NGOs – to consider how both the problems of and the solutions to 
security of supply differ today from the past. Based on presentations given by Working Party 
members and invited guest speakers, the group had intensive discussions on how to meet the 
challenges of security of supply in a liberal market. Its principle conclusions are summarised in 
the Executive Summary. A longer version of the main findings can be found in Chapter 6.  
I want to thank the members of the Working Party for their active and positive contributions. 
Although all members endorse the general content of the report, this should not be construed to 
mean that each member subscribes to every sentence of the text. 
 
Carl-Erik Nyquist 
Chairman of the CEPS Working Party 
Former CEO, Vattenfall 
T  
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SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY 
A QUESTION FOR POLICY OR THE MARKETS? 
REPORT OF A CEPS WORKING PARTY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
he European Commission’s Green Paper on security of energy supply (European 
Commission, 2000a) has initiated a debate on the challenges posed to Europe by security 
of energy supply now and in the future. This debate is being launched at a time of major 
changes. Liberalisation of energy markets across the entire European Economic Area (EEA) is 
leading to a new allocation of responsibilities between governments, firms and consumers but 
also to a new balance between EU/EEA and member state action. Liberalisation is also 
transforming the way energy is produced and consumed. At the same time, climate change 
policy affects fuel choices and is leading to calls for increased speed of innovation. The attacks 
of 11 September in the US, finally, have brought to the surface new uncertainties of crime, civil 
strife and war. The CEPS Working Party report has analysed security of supply in this new 
context. It identifies the likely major supply risks and proposes concrete recommendations on 
how to address them. 
Taking the new context of energy security as its starting point for discussion, this report found 
that the prime responsibility for achieving security of supply has moved from government to 
market participants. Security of supply becomes a shared responsibility among energy 
companies, governments, and, directly and indirectly, all consumers. 
This report defines security of supply as insurance against supply risks. Security of supply is 
defined as a cost-effective risk management strategy, which is the collective responsibility of 
governments, firms and consumers, resting broadly on three pillars. The first pillar is energy 
efficiency, which increases the flexibility of the energy chain and provides an additional margin 
of security or achieves the same security margin at a reduced cost. The second is technology 
development, which is essential to ensure efficient production and use of energy and to cope 
with environmental challenges. The third pillar is supply optimisation, by which we mean 
diversification by fuel and region and support for the proper functioning of the market, which 
should increase the number of market participants and thereby the flexibility and resilience of 
the system. 
In many i nstances, markets are an efficient tool for achieving security of supply. The report 
provides ample support for this assertion. This is not to say, however, that the market can 
achieve everything. Sometimes liberal markets create new risks that need to be addressed if the 
current level of security is to be maintained. Especially for the long-term, beyond the time 
period in which liquid energy markets can be expected to operate, government action will be 
needed. The report also identifies the scope for this action. 
The report draws a distinction between continuity and reliability of supply (i.e. short-term 
security of supply) on the one hand, and long-term concerns about fuel availability, including 
network investment (i.e. long-term security of supply) on the other. The analysis concludes that 
the most likely and striking risks are associated with continuity, particularly – but not only – in 
electricity. Examples include the possible erosion of reserve capacity or a lack of investment in 
network capacity. Liberalisation can lead to new solutions. Distributed generation, e.g. 
decentralised power generation, is one example. It can potentially reduce the vulnerability and 
increase the flexibility of the electricity grid, provided that technical and financial issues related 
to the interaction with the grid are solved. Another potential risk is that unwarranted public 
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opposition should prevail, for instance, against necessary new investment in generation capacity 
and overhead lines. The risks to security of supply p osed by a lack of reserve capacity were 
illustrated by the protests over high short-term electricity prices in the Nordic market and the 
power shortages caused by regulatory failure in California. The importance of public opinion 
was demonstrated by the blockages of refineries and roads in the UK throughout 2000.  
The report also analyses the long-term concerns, which concentrate mainly on fuel availability, 
including network development. Fuel availability might become a cause for concern beyond 
2020, but before then the outlook for fuel sources is good, with Europe surrounded by diverse 
and abundant sources of gas and oil. The actual situation will be heavily influenced by the 
progress achieved in developing exploration and extraction technologies as well a s by 
improvements made in energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. 
Long-term risks relating to oil are mainly associated with ensuring sufficient investment to 
develop and physically deliver the necessary oil to the markets, as well as the ability to manage 
the political risks associated with supplier countries. In natural gas, long-term security of supply 
relates to investment and political risk. Considerable investment is needed for infrastructural 
development, especially upstream and in storage. As a result, producers must be made to feel 
confident that they will be able to sell the gas on the wholesale markets and be provided with 
sufficiently clear market (price) signals to assess the economics of a potential project.  
In conclusion, CEPS proposes that any discussion on security of supply should focus on the 
following key messages: 
Key Messages  
1.  Security of supply consists of different approaches aimed at insuring against supply risks. 
Security of supply can become a cost-effective risk-management strategy of governments, 
firms and customers. The main tools for risk-management are energy efficiency, technology 
development and optimisation of supply. Thus, according to this logic, import dependency 
is not a supply problem as long as imports are diversified and the associated risks are 
properly managed. Growing concerns over climate change and uncertainties  – such as 
crime, terrorism and warfare – are important factors to be considered.  
2.  The prime responsibility for achieving security of supply has moved from governments to 
market participants in liberalised markets. Security of supply becomes a common 
responsibility to be shared among government, energy firms and, directly and indirectly, all 
customers. Markets can be an efficient tool for delivering the policy aim of security of 
supply but can change the nature of supply risks, necessitating a variety of government 
responses. EU and member state action is especially needed for the long-term, beyond the 
period when liquid energy markets can be expected to operate effectively. 
3.  A distinction can be drawn between continuity and reliability of supply on the one hand, 
and long-term concerns about fuel availability, including network investment, on the other. 
The most likely and striking supply risks are associated with reliability, especially in 
electricity and natural gas markets. Major risks associated with electricity supply include 
ensuring adequate reserve capacity, especially in liberalised markets. Security of supply 
could also be undermined if unwarranted public opposition prevails against the construction 
of necessary new generation projects or the installation of transmission lines. To effectively 
respond to the public’s concerns, firms should step up efforts to provide transparent 
information and full justification of new projects.  
4.  To address security-of-supply concerns, the EU should develop a policy framework relying 
on energy efficiency, technology development and optimisation of supply.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ecurity of energy supply, h aving attracted only limited interest on the part of policy-
makers in recent years, is back on the agenda. This new interest is evidenced by the wide-
ranging debate launched by the European Commission with publication of its Green Paper 
on security of supply (European Commission, 2000a). The revival of OPEC, higher crude oil 
prices and international political instability – evidenced most recently by the terrorist attacks of 
11 September and the war in Afghanistan – have highlighted anew the risks of disruptions to 
supply. This report, however, is not about the geopolitical dimension, but rather the modified 
outlook for security of energy supply in light of a rapidly changing economic environment.  
Energy market liberalisation and growing international economic interdependence have affected 
governments’ ability to react to security-of-supply challenges. The internal market (which 
increasingly covers energy) and EU enlargement have not only changed the policy instruments 
available to governments. They have also altered the reference framework for policy and market 
participants alike. Whereas in the past security of supply was largely seen  – with some 
exceptions – as a national responsibility, for the frame of reference has increasingly become the 
EU/EEA (European Union/European Economic Area, the latter comprising the EU member 
states plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) as well as the candidate countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Hence, there is a need for a debate on what constitutes the “European 
dimension” of security of supply and what are the “new” ingredients of such a policy.  
The relationship between liberalisation and security of supply is multifaceted. In general, 
liberalisation increases security of supply by increasing the number of market participants and 
improving the flexibility of the energy systems. Liberalisation may, however, also pose new 
risks, as this report shows. Moreover, governments may need to re-assess the level of security of 
supply they seek to achieve. Markets make the costs of security of supply more transparent, 
which in turn can lead to a situation in which consumers are prepared to pay a premium for 
increased security of supply or to accept a reduced level of security in exchange for lower 
prices. Liberalisation’s main effect, however, is that it has shifted the prime responsibility for 
achieving security of supply from governments to market participants. The reason is simple. As 
can be witnessed in other markets, for example financial markets, fully competitive markets 
significantly reduce the government’s scope for intervention. Over the long-term, measures that 
rub against the grain of the market are doomed to fail. Markets can actually serve as a very 
effective and efficient tool in achieving policy objectives: governments establish the objectives 
and set the rules that enable firms to achieve those objectives. As a result, security of supply has 
become a common responsibility shared among firms, government and, sometimes, individual 
consumers, with the primary responsibility resting on firms, including both supply companies 
and large industrial customers. It is the objective of this report to identify the respective roles of 
supply companies, large industrial users, individual customers and governments.  
Security-of-supply objectives need to be consistent with other EU policies, notably the other 
two pillars of EU energy policy: environmental protection and competitiveness (see European 
Commission, 1995). In the environmental field, climate change can be expected to have a major 
influence on security of supply through its effect on fuel choice. The vulnerability to terrorist 
attacks is also likely to figure higher on the list of possible risks in the future. In an increasingly 
competitive world, we can expect that cost-effectiveness will become more important. This 
leads to the question of whether the EU’s two energy policy pillars – security of supply and 
environmental protection – should be complemented by a third pillar of “cost-effectiveness” – 
as opposed to “competitiveness”, the Commission’s preferred term. A well managed 
competitive energy market is the most cost-effective way to satisfy EU energy policy objectives. 
S EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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This report analyses the period between now and 2020, although Chapter 3.2 provides a brief 
outlook beyond. Thus, by “long term” we mean basically 2020, and by “short term”, a period of 
up to five-to-ten years. This report also uses the terms “long term” and “short term” as they have 
been introduced in the literature by the International Energy Agency (IEA), among others. In 
this context “short-term” security of supply describes issues of continuity and reliability or 
system security such as risks of power failure or of accidents. “Long-term” security of supply 
means (long-term) political risks of unreliable supply sources or economic risks of insufficient 
investment.  
We have chosen as our geographical frame of reference the European Economic Area. This is 
based mainly on the role Norway plays in the EU’s internal market including energy and its 
importance as a primary fuel supplier. If we speak of government other than those of the EU 
member states, we refer to either the EU or the EEA. In most cases we use the term EU, 
acknowledging the fact that it is the EU institutions that will be responsible for action 
throughout the EU/EEA. Although we focus on the EU/EEA in its current form, the analysis 
also recognises that within the reference time frame (i.e. the next two decades), the EU’s 
membership will have changed considerably. At the same time, however, the issues associated 
with security of supply will only be slightly altered by enlargement. By and large, the energy 
issues in the candidate countries are similar to those pertinent to the current EEA member states. 
This report attempts to develop a conceptual framework for security of energy supply in the 
EU/EEA. It therefore takes a broad view and does not cover sector-specific issues that have 
been described, for example, in the numerous responses to the Commission’s Green Paper on 
security of supply. These are published on the website of the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General of Transport and Energy 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/index_en.html). 
Chapter 2 of this report describes the new context of security of supply, identifies possible risks 
and puts forward a definition of security of supply. Chapter 3 provides an outlook of demand 
projections by sector and fuels until 2020 and beyond. This chapter also prepares the ground for 
the analysis of supply consequences undertaken in Chapter 5. Chapter 4 zooms in on security of 
supply at the EU level to assess the role of energy efficiency and technology. It closes with a 
discussion on public opinion and large investments. The fifth chapter discusses strategies to 
optimise supply by sector. It distinguishes between primary fuels and electricity and identifies 
major risks for the latter. The concluding Chapter 6 outlines a proposal for an EU insurance 
policy both for the short and long term. The report concludes with two annexes. Annex 1 lists in 
tabular form the major supply risks and their possible impact. Annex 2 lists members of the 
CEPS Working Party and their invited guests and speakers.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SECURITY OF SUPPLY REDEFINED 
IN AN AGE OF LIBERAL ENERGY MARKETS 
 
iberalisation, privatisation and globalisation have fundamentally altered the policy 
instruments at the disposal of governments. In the past, security-of-supply policy has 
predominantly consisted of government-initiated diplomatic – and sometimes military – 
actions to ensure physical supply, with limited emphasis on costs. With regard to the external 
aspects of security-of-supply policy, the focus was on diversification, both in terms of regions 
and types of fuel. This policy often led to relatively rigid long-term contracts, an emphasis on 
physical infrastructures, a dialogue between consumer and producer countries and mechanisms 
that could deal with emergency situations (e.g. strategic stocks or interconnections). The frame 
of reference was usually the member state, and seldom the EU. Domestically, the member 
states’ response was to commit resources to developing indigenous energy sources, such as coal, 
peat, hydro or nuclear fission (considered as almost indigenous), c ombined with largely 
unconvincing demand-side policies. Moreover, strong domestic companies or even monopolies 
were created, which could carry the “necessary weight” externally and be able to support heavy 
investments internally. There were some initiatives at the EU-level, however, such as in the 
fields of research and external relations, and national borders played a smaller role in areas 
where market integration was more advanced, such as for oil products.  
2.1  Security of supply defined 
Any serious discussion of security of supply requires a common understanding of the definition 
of the concept and the kinds of risks that should be considered. A number of different 
approaches to and definitions of security of supply were considered by the Working Party. See 
Box 1 for a description of the three most commonly encountered definitions.  
As agreed by the Working Party, this report uses the following definition: 
Security of supply consists of a variety of approaches aimed at insuring against 
supply risks. Security of supply becomes a cost-effective risk-management strategy 
of governments, firms and consumers.  
Note that this definition avoids the term “policy”. This stems from the fact that security of 
supply is a shared responsibility between governments, firms and customers. In fact, as we 
show, most of the risk can be assumed by industry – both suppliers and industrial consumers. 
Only where industry is unable to take the risk or has no influence to mitigate the risk is 
government policy demanded. The tools applied by governments, firms and consumers are 
energy efficiency, technological development and optimisation of supply. 
Security of supply has two equally important constituent parts: physical availability and price. 
Given that energy prices crucially affect economic growth and wealth and the competitiveness 
of industries, price and physical availability are inextricably linked.
1 This link also prevails for 
domestic customers, although in a different way and on a different scale. It is low-income 
groups in particular that are the hardest hit by high energy prices, whether they are a result of a 
too-costly security-of-supply policy or a supply shortage that tends to lead to price increases. As 
a result, cost-effectiveness of the insurance is an important part of the definition of security of 
supply. 
                                                 
1 Since all major OECD countries including the US, Japan and the EU are price takers (of world market 
prices), the distortions to competition due to different border prices should not be excessive, as long as 
world markets function. Energy price differentials are usually a result of different tax levels or a lack of 
competition in energy markets.  
L EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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Box 1. Zooming in on security of supply 
 
European Commission: “… energy supply security must be geared to ensuring … the proper functioning 
of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability … at a price which is affordable … while 
respecting environmental concerns.… Security of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency 
or to minimise dependence, but aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence”. (European 
Commission, 2000a, p. 2) 
 International Energy Agency: “ Technological developments will affect the choice and cost of future 
energy systems but the pace and direction of change is highly uncertain. Governments will … have an 
important role to play in reducing the risk of supply disruptions. Regulatory and market reforms … will 
also affect supply. Increased competition between different fuels and between different suppliers of the 
same fuel will tend to narrow the gap between production cost and market prices, reducing monopoly 
rents, encouraging greater efficiency and lowering the cost of supply.” (International Energy Agency, 
2001a)  
European Parliament: “Being dependent on imports is neither necessarily a bad thing nor economically 
inefficient provided the sources are diverse, no one supplier is dominant and we can produce sufficient 
goods and services to pay for them.… We cannot alter the fact of where the oil comes from, but we can do 
a number of things on the demand side, in particular in the transport sector.” (European Parliament, 
2001) 
This does not mean that price volatility itself is a concern of security-of-supply policy, however. 
On the contrary, price volatility can be seen as proof that the markets work. If demand and 
supply are not in balance, prices change to provide market signals to close the gap. Another 
important feature is that markets provide for financial products such as derivatives to deal with 
price volatility.  
2.2  What are the supply risks? 
In order to make the Working Party’s definition operational, it is necessary to first identify the 
risks that should be insured against and to agree on their likelihood (i.e. a risk assessment) as 
well as the potential consequences. The second step of the analysis is to identify the possible 
responses and the responsible actor (i.e.  risk management). Note that some risks might 
deliberately go uninsured because they are “uninsurable” at least in the short term (e.g. terrorist 
attacks) or may be extremely unlikely (e.g. a meteorite falling on a major installation). 
It is important to note that the time scale of different risks differs considerably from fractions of 
a second to hundreds of years. In the past, risks have sometimes been divided between short- and 
long-term risks (see International Energy Agency, 1995). Short-term risks are  generally 
associated with supply shortages due to accidents, terrorist attacks, extreme weather conditions 
or technical failure of the grid. Long-term risks are usually separated into economic and political 
risks. The former could include an inability to deliver sufficient quantities of energy due to an 
imbalance of supply and demand (e.g. unexpected demand growth). Political risks might stem 
from a deliberate government policy to suspend deliveries or a war or civil war that prevented 
exports.
2 Regulatory  failure is also a political risk. While such a distinction is helpful in 
identifying and distinguishing the different risks, it is less helpful in identifying adequate risk-
management strategies, given that linkages between the responses to short- and long-term risks 
are closely interrelated. 
In line with the European Commission’s Green Paper on security of supply, the following risks 
can be identified: 
                                                 
2 See Egenhofer and Labory (1998), European Commission (1999a) and International Energy Agency, 
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-  Technical risks include systems failure due to weather, lack of capital investment or 
generally bad conditions of the energy system. 
-  Economic risks cover mainly imbalances between demand and supply due to a lack of 
investment or insufficient contracting. 
-  Political risks outline potential government policies to suspend deliveries due to deliberate 
policies or war or civil strife or as a result of failed regulation, which is referred to as 
regulatory risk. 
-  Environmental risks describe the potential damage from accidents (oil spills, nuclear 
accidents) or pollution, including pollution whose effects are less tangible or predictable 
(e.g. greenhouse gas emissions). 
A more complete discussion of major risks and suitable risk-management strategies will be 
provided in the concluding Chapter 6. Annex 1 presents in tabular form the major risks 
identified by the Working Party. 
2.3  The economic and political environment revisited 
The traditional notion of security of supply has come under pressure from a number of sources. 
EU market integration, for example, notably for oil products, electricity and gas and in the 
future for energy service companies, has meant that the EEA, if not beyond, has increasingly 
become the reference framework. National responses are defined by EU law and policy, notably 
the internal market and competition policy. Widespread privatisation of (national) energy 
companies and the increasing cross-border or even cross-continental character of energy 
companies have changed the outlook for governments to use private business for public policy 
goals such as security of supply. The global nature of competition in capital markets forces 
companies to satisfy shareholders. This is also true for infrastructure, which is now mostly 
privately financed and needs to satisfy capital market requirements for an adequate rate of 
return. Major companies increasingly deal with security of supply as part of their business 
strategy. While this was common for oil companies for some time now, gas and electricity 
companies are increasingly taking a similar approach.  
With the liberalisation of energy markets, the role of the customer has also changed. In the 
previous monopolistic situation, responsibility for security of supply lay almost entirely with the 
supply company, which was supervised by the government. In liberal markets, customers have a 
choice whether to assume responsibility for security of supply themselves or to allow the supply 
company to bear the responsibility and subsequently pay for it
3 through higher energy prices. 
The former is typically done by large industrial users, for which (short-term) security might not 
be a problem if they can switch fuels. A large industrial user may choose to buy gas from a 
risky but cheap source, accepting the risk of higher short-term prices from a spot market or 
mitigating the risk by installing a dual firing capability or a back-up from another supplier. 
At industry level, a number of measures to reduce the risk of disruptions can be taken, such as 
storage close to consumers, interruptible supplies, encouragement of new entrants and short-
term markets. Some of these solutions show that supply security is increasingly becoming a 
commercial concern. Thus, storage close to customers and interruptible supplies are established 
primarily for commercial reasons in a competitive liberal market. In such markets, the customer 
may switch suppliers or choose to sell some or all of his energy back to the market, thus 
enhancing security of supply for others. That the customer can exercise an economic choice 
                                                 
3 Including a risk premium. In oil, for example, prices in long-term energy supply contracts tend to be 
higher than in spot markets, reflecting a higher security-of-supply risk. EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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enhances security-of-supply, and the market provides an efficient mechanism for sharing the 
benefits with other customers. 
Responsibility for security of supply can be more effectively distributed in more competitive 
markets. More competitiveness means more actors, hence less dependence on single companies 
or monopolies, and more competitive prices. As a result, to take a long-term perspective, large 
industrial customers have an interest in supporting new entrants in newly opening markets. 
Similarly, industrial customers may take a stake at least temporarily and therefore a risk in new 
infrastructure investment, should this increase competition (thereby leading to lower prices) or 
flexibility (thereby promoting security of supply). Direct involvement by large energy users 
means an increase in the numbers of players, however, and hence more flexibility and higher 
security of supply in general.  
The same scope does not exist for residential, commercial or small industrial consumers, 
although they may through intermediaries, e.g. energy service companies, achieve some 
flexibility in handling (short-term) supply risks. Generally, the short-term risks are either 
covered by commercial considerations of the supply company, which wants to avoid failing to 
deliver the energy that it has promised to sell, or as a last resort by public-service obligations. 
Such obligations have been widely used throughout Europe, in different forms, financed by 
different means, in both regulated and liberalised markets. In a monopoly market, if the supply 
is cut off, the supplier fails, but in a properly regulated and fully competitive market, an 
alternative supplier always emerges to maintain the supply and to take over the failed supplier’s 
customer base. 
But change is not limited to the economic and regulatory environment. Additional challenges 
have emerged. First and foremost, climate change has become a major driver of energy and 
environmental policy. Climate change policy affects the choice of fuel by making high carbon 
fuels less attractive in the market. In addition, climate change is becoming the major driving 
force for a renewed interest in energy efficiency and conservation. This is why the European 
Commission has made energy efficiency a priority goal in its Green Paper. Security-of-supply 
priorities will also be influenced by unexpected events such as the terrorist attacks in the US on 
11 September, although it is too early to foresee the consequences of this incident. 
As a result of the changed economic and political environment, the balance of responsibility for 
security of supply has been shifted towards a shared responsibility between governments, firms 
and consumers with the primary burden falling on firms, both energy supply companies and 
industrial consumers. The main tools available to government in this new context are energy 
efficiency, technology development and optimisation of supply.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EUROPEAN ENERGY DEMAND UNTIL 2020 AND BEYOND 
 
pproaches to security of supply will depend on long-term trends for demand growth to 
ensure that energy demand can be met. This chapter therefore gives a brief overview of 
the expected demand growth in the main sectors (e.g. transport, industry, electricity and 
heating) and the resulting possible fuel mixes. This chapter also analyses the potential of 
technological developments and how these are likely to impact demand and by extension 
security of supply. 
3.1  The EU until 2020 
The European Commission projects a continuation of the historical trend of demand growth of 
over 1% a year since 1986.
4 This growth in demand is projected despite the fact that energy 
demand growth is largely decoupled from economic growth and taking into account current and 
in-the-pipeline climate policies. The accession countries are expected to experience a somewhat 
higher growth than the EU as a whole (European Commission, 2000a). As a result Europe’s 
absolute energy consumption is expected to rise in the period leading up to 2020 and beyond. 
The security-of-supply consequences of this rising demand depend, first, on the policy decisions 
that could otherwise divert Europe from this business-as-usual outlook, and second, on the 
future fuel mix of European energy consumption. The main growth areas for demand will be 
transport and energy in buildings (mainly electricity and heating); industry growth will remain 
relatively stable.
5  
3.1.1  Trends in energy consumption under business-as-usual conditions
6 
Energy consumption in the industrial sector in 2000 was around 27% of the annual EU final 
energy use – 258 Mtoe (million tonnes of energy equivalent) out of a total final energy demand 
of 957 Mtoe. It is forecast to rise at a relatively modest rate of between 0.4 and 0.9% by 2020 
(an absolute increase of 32.4 Mtoe). Industry, therefore, presents only limited extra demand up 
to 2020. 
Contrary to total gross energy consumption, which has been largely decoupled from GDP 
growth, the transport sector is expected to grow at the same rate as GDP, with a particular 
emphasis on road and air traffic. Energy consumption in the transport sector is likely to grow at 
an annual rate of 1.5-1.7% until 2010 and thereafter by 0.4% per annum until 2020 (from 300 
Mtoe in 2000, to 360 Mtoe by 2020, retaining a constant share of total energy demand of about 
32%).
7 Unlike other sectors, transport is almost entirely dependent on a single fuel, oil. 
Significantly, alternative fuels are not likely to make strong inroads into transport fuel before 
2020. Policy options are limited for transport growth: whereas the European Commission 
expects to be able to stabilise growth in energy consumption for passenger transport by 2010, 
consumption from freight transport will increase by 28% by 2010 even if policy measures are 
put into place.
8 
                                                 
4 The European Commission’s Shared Analysis Project predicts average annual growth of 1.1% in final 
energy demand until 2010, slowing to 0.5% growth from 2010 to 2020; growth in the accession countries’ 
energy consumption will be higher than for the current EU-15 (European Commission, 1999b, p. 186). 
5 Figures from European Commission, (2000b), pp. 48-52. 
6 All figures from European Commission (1999b). 
7 European Commission (2000b), p. 50. 
8 This is assuming a rather optimistic annual 3% GDP growth per annum (see European Commission, 
2001a). 
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Fossil fuels will thus dominate the transport sector’s energy needs for the next two decades. 
Nevertheless, there is great scope – of up to 40% – for optimising conventional powertrain 
systems and cars and thus reducing fuel consumption. Alternative fuels for use in internal 
combustion engines such as bio-fuels could offer a partial alternative (of less than 5%) or 
supplement to oil-based petrol. A promising alternative is the production of conventional liquid 
fuels from a synthesis gas gained by gasification of natural gas or biomass, which could 
theoretically be produced indigenously within the EU, particularly by the accession countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Due to economic advantages, however, these fuels are likely to be 
produced outside the EU. 
The EU’s 2000 energy consumption in the residential and tertiary sector was at around 40% of 
the annual EU final energy demand, or 396 Mtoe. Energy consumption in this sector is forecast 
to rise to 459 Mtoe by 2020 (41% of total projected European final energy demand). According 
to the Commission, great potential still exists for refurbishment of existing stock and domestic 
equipment and investment in energy-efficient appliances, as well as education in energy-
efficient use. The use of renewable energy in the residential sector could also be increased 
dramatically with appropriate incentives, the Commission believes.
9 
 
Electricity consumption in the European Union grew by 2.1% per annum between 1985-95, and 
by 1.9% per annum since 1995.
10 Electricity consumption is projected to rise from the current 
600 Gigawatt electric (GWe) of installed capacity to 800-900 GWe in 2020 (European 
Commission, 2000a, p. 14). Most of this new capacity will be met by non-renewable sources 
such as nuclear, solid fuel and natural gas, or be offset by increased demand-side management, 
even if the ambitious targets for renewables of 22.1% of total electricity in 2010 under the 
                                                 
9 See European Commission (2000b), p. 51. 
10 Ibid., p. 47. 
Figure 1. Projected EU-30 fuel mix until 2020 
 
Source: European Commission (2000), p. 6. SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY 
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recently adopted directive on electricity from renewable energy sources are met.
11 Moreover, 
300 GWe of existing capacity will have to be replaced over the next 20 years to replace power 
stations that have reached the end of their lives (European Commission, 2000a, p.14). This 
means that up to 600 GWe of the installed capacity in 2020 has yet to be built, presenting a 
potentially crucial opportunity to affect fuel technology choice. 
The overall fuel mix is expected to remain by-and-large unchanged in Europe up to and beyond 
2020 (see Figure 1). Oil will remain dominant for the transport sector, with biofuels not 
expected to provide more than 5% of transport’s energy needs. Overall, oil’s share will remain 
constant at about 42% of gross inland consumption. Natural gas will slightly increase its share 
in the overall energy balance from 23% in 2000 to 27% in 2020. 
3.1.2  Demand-side policy implications 
These trends give weight to the European Commission’s conclusions (European Commission, 
2000a, p. 20) that the European Union faces an increase in its energy dependence to about 70% 
by 2020-30. The policy implications of this growing dependence are not automatic, however. 
As will be explored later in this report, it is not so much the dependence on external supplies 
that matters as how that dependence is spread across different suppliers and fuels and how the 
security-of-supply implications of this diversification are managed.  
On the demand side, there is much scope for offsetting demand through energy efficiency, to a 
lesser extent in the transport sector and to a greater extent in the tertiary and domestic sectors. 
Figure 2 graphs the Commission’s estimates of the economic potential for energy efficiency in 
three sectors. Other studies indicate higher efficiency potential. For example, a study for 
EuroACE has identified efficiency potential of up to 50-60% in the domestic and tertiary sectors 
using available technologies (CALEB Management Services, 1999).  
 
Figure 2. Available economic potential for energy efficiency in the EU, 1998-2010 
 
Source: European Commission (2000b), p. 49. 
 
                                                 
11 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2000 on the 
promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market, 
COM(2000)279, final adoption by Council 7 September 2001. The European Commission accepts that 
the 22.1% target in 2010 will not be met without additional policy measures (see European Commission, 
2000a, p. 79). EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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The most dramatic influence, however, could be exerted by technology, which could alter the 
fuel mix for electricity, heating and even transport. Technology, especially fuel-cell technology, 
holds great potential to shift energy production away from sources associated with security-of-
supply risks. Fuel cells, which produce electricity through an electrochemical reaction with very 
low emissions and high efficiency, hold out the promise that petrol could eventually be 
substituted by hydrogen for vehicle transport, although fuel-cell automobiles will most likely 
enter the market gradually through a process of evolution, not revolution. The potential 
widespread use of fuel-cell cars may not occur before 2020, or at least not before the production 
costs are lowered, the storage tanks for the hydrogen is reduced in size, an infrastructure for the 
distribution of hydrogen is in place and sustainable and economic sources of hydrogen (i.e. 
based on renewables) are available. The situation for electricity may be different. Fuel-cell 
technology for fixed-point electricity production could substantially offset fossil-fuel 
consumption for electricity production given the right market conditions, reduction in fuel-cell 
production costs and, crucially, the production of hydrogen by non-fossil-fuel processes. 
3.2  The global context up to 2020 and beyond 
A major challenge to Europe’s security of energy supply lies in competition for supply posed by 
the rising energy consumption that is predicted under business-as-usual scenarios in third 
countries. Total final energy consumption in the EU is projected to grow by 22% in the period 
1990-2020, but demand in the world outside the EU is likely to be even faster, particularly in 
non-OECD countries (European Parliament, 2001). Beyond 2020, when energy consumption 
will continue to rise, the EU will almost certainly have lost its monopsony status for the gas 
suppliers that surround it, which could affect its bargaining power. The limiting factors to 
primary energy production in the future are not likely to be energy resources, however, since 
there are ample resources of oil, coal, gas and uranium to support growth in the longer term. 
Rather, the rate at which energy consumption will rise will partly be set by the cost of recovery 
and production, which will in turn be informed by technological developments. 
Rising energy demand in Europe and outside, the growing importance to Europe’s energy 
supply of individual supply sources or transportation routes, and the expected environmental 
constraint posed by climate-change policy comprise the long-term challenges to Europe’s 
security of supply. One partial response to these challenges is increased energy efficiency, 
which could arise as a result of an increasingly stringent obligation to reduce CO2 emissions. 
Technological development will be another major part of the solution, both for the production of 
primary energy and the development of innovative processes such as carbon sequestration, CO2 
injection or scrubbing, that could allow the production of energy from coal despite a restraint on 
CO2 emissions. The supply situation is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
Table 1. Global primary energy demand by region 
Percentage of total  Country 
1990  2010  2020 
EU  15.9  13.3  10.7 
Non-EU OECD  33.2  31.2  27 
Developing countries  30.4  43.3  49.1 
CEE & FSU  20.5  12.2  13.2 
Total world (Mtoe)  8273  11669 (+41%)  14907 (+80%) 
Note: CEE: Central and Eastern Europe; FSU: Former Soviet Union. 
Source: European Commission (1999b). 
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CHAPTER 4 
SECURITY OF SUPPLY AT EU LEVEL 
 
he lack of an energy chapter in the EC Treaty has not meant that the European Union has 
been absent in EU energy policy. Other competencies conferred on the EU via the 
Treaty, such as i n the fields of the internal market and competition policy, the 
environment, research and trans-European networks, have allowed the EU to play an active part 
in energy policy and, by extension, security of supply (Egenhofer, 1997). The growing 
economic and political interdependence of member states resulting from deepening integration 
(e.g. the internal market including energy, monetary union, common foreign and security 
policy) or international environmental agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, are increasingly 
leading to a convergence of EU member state policies. This in turn may lead to a change in the 
perceived added value of EU action, notably in the areas of energy efficiency, technology 
development and optimisation of supply.  
4.1  Energy efficiency 
Energy efficiency and conservation measures were identified in the European Commission’s 
Green Paper as among one of the overriding priorities in EU policy on security of supply and on 
energy in general. As a consequence, the Green Paper states, “the Union must rebalance its 
supply policy by clear action in favour of a demand policy” (p. 3) and designate energy 
efficiency as the first pillar of security of supply. 
While it is true that achieving security of supply was a driver behind energy efficiency measures 
initiated during the oil crises of the 1970s, energy efficiency and conservation have more 
recently been undertaken primarily for environmental reasons. Irrespective of the motivation, 
past policies on energy efficiency have not lived up to expectations due to a failure to address a 
number of barriers to energy efficiency. These include fossil fuel subsidies, distorting taxation 
systems, a lack of incentives, information and capital, the supply-side paradigm, the 
landlord/tenant barrier and sometimes a lack of internalisation of external costs. Some fear that 
energy efficiency will suffer further with falling prices as a consequence of energy 
liberalisation. But even if prices fall, energy efficiency and opportunities provided by the market 
for demand-side management offer ways to hedge against future price spikes. 
As a side benefit, energy efficiency is also a means to reduce import dependency, but whether 
this will increase security of supply depends on a number of assumptions. The first is whether 
one considers import dependency as a risk per se. This need not necessarily be the case. As 
Giles Chichester, Member of the European Parliament and Rapporteur for the Parliament’s 
report on the Commission Green Paper, writes, “being dependent on imports is neither 
necessarily a bad thing nor economically inefficient provided the sources are diverse, no one 
supplier is dominant and we can produce sufficient goods and services to pay for them” 
(European Parliament, 2001, p. 17). 
Nevertheless, energy efficiency achieved by way of reducing demand increases the flexibility of 
the whole energy chain and thereby provides an additional margin of security. Put another way, 
if the flexibility needed to cope with supply failure is a proportion of overall energy demand, 
then the cost of providing a constant level of security of supply is reduced if overall energy 
demand is reduced. Another standard argument about the relationship between energy efficiency 
and security of supply is less clear cut. Although in theory conservation and efficiency should 
allow the EU to rely on less-risky supply areas, this might no longer be true if one takes into 
account the strong growth projected in other parts of the world, notably developing countries. 
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Domestic EU savings could be eaten up by growth elsewhere unless similar policy actions are 
introduced on a worldwide scale.
12  
It should be remembered that energy efficiency has been the beneficiary of technological 
development.. Refrigerators today are several times more efficient than they were 20 years ago. 
This improvement, however, is not explained so much by a “desire to save energy” as by a 
“desire to save money”. On the other hand, technological development can also be driven by 
inventions such as the internal combustion engine, which h as replaced less energy-intensive 
means of transport.  
4.2  The role of technology 
“In the long term,” says the European Commission (2000a, p. 38), “it will be technological 
developments that pose the principal threat to OPEC, namely, new production techniques in 
difficult areas, using non-conventional oil, and the development of new fuel substitutes and the 
associated technologies, chiefly in the transport sector.” Irrespective of whether or not one 
shares this view, technology is crucial for meeting the EU’s energy challenges related both to 
security of supply and the environment.  
4.2.1  R&D funding  
New technologies will be developed if they promise economic rent. Where this is the case, 
research and development (R&D) can firmly be left to the market and  companies. Since 
technological innovation is one of the areas in which companies compete, liberalisation in 
principle has a beneficial effect on technological innovation with regard to both the speed of 
innovation and the efficiency with which the resources will be used. Technological innovation 
is one of the areas where companies want to distinguish themselves from their competitors. 
Typically this is in the area of commercial development and the  application of new 
technologies.  
The situation is different for those areas where the economic rent is  uncertain due to, for 
example, the level of economic risk or a very long time horizon or both (e.g. fusion, hydrogen, 
CO2-sequestration). In the language of economists, this is described as market failure. Market 
failure is usually associated with basic research or the pre-commercial development of new 
technologies. In many cases, some state intervention is then needed. The market supports 
efficiency but not necessarily research. 
Private-sector spending on energy R&D is in rapid decline. Moreover, R&D investments are 
being redirected from longer-term projects that might be seen as having a higher value from a 
public-good perspective, towards short-term research to meet the more immediate needs of 
energy companies in competitive markets. For instance, utilities in the UK appear to have 
reduced their R&D investments steadily over the past decade, to a level that currently stands 
between 0.1 and 0.3% of sales. The largest oil and gas companies in the US reduced their R&D 
investments by 43% on average throughout the 1990s (Dooley and Runci, 1999). The fact that 
central R&D spending has decreased in a period of liberalisation may be a pointer, although the 
witnessed reduction of private energy R&D spending cannot only be  associated with 
liberalisation: reductions have also taken place in those countries and companies where 
liberalisation was slower to develop. In addition, the level of spending does not reveal the 
efficiency with which funds were used. 
More worrying perhaps is the fact that public funding has also gone down (see Table 2). Nine 
OECD countries currently perform more than 95% of the world’s public-sector energy R&D 
(the US, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, France, Italy, Canada and Switzerland). 
                                                 
12 The same is true for nuclear, coal or renewables. SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY 
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Between 1985 and 1995, these nine countries each reduced their budgets for energy R&D on 
average by more than 20% in real terms. In Germany, Italy and the UK, budgets were slashed 
by 70% or more over the same period. The US federal energy R&D programme fell by 2 6% 
over the period 1990-97 (a decline of $1.2 billion in real terms). The notable exceptions are 
Switzerland and Japan. Public R&D funding is now almost non-existent for energy efficiency 
materials and equipment.  
Table 2. OECD public energy R&D funding, 1985-95 
Country  Percentage in real growth, 1985-95 
Switzerland  32 
Japan  8 
France  -6 
US  -9 
Netherlands  -33 
Canada  -45 
Germany  -74 
Italy  -75 
UK  -88 
Source: OECD data. 
There are two possible responses to this decline. One is to increase public funding while the 
other is to address the market failures. 
The first option to increase public funding will find its limits in the almost universal – certainly 
European  – drive towards fiscal consolidation. In addition, it raises a number of difficult 
practical issues. The first question is how governments should intervene, i.e. what instruments 
should they use. Should governments fund third-party research or should they maintain research 
institutes such as the EU’s Joint Research Centres? Another instrument would be to provide 
generous tax breaks for R&D. A second question relates to the respective role of EU and 
member-state funding. It appears that the EU’s attempts to focus on creating EU-wide research 
networks and centres of excellence have been successful. At a minimum this has avoided the 
duplication of research efforts in the EU. The third question is who pays for government-
sponsored research. Research subsidies could for example be obtained from the general budget 
or secured through earmarked funds.  
The second option is to address the market failures such as spillover effects, inefficiencies in the 
financial sector, risk aversion, knowledge as a public good or lack of coordination. More recent 
scientific evidence seems to suggest that making research more “profitable” (i.e. increasing the 
economic rent) may yield better results than improving the supply side. An important 
observation is that companies with healthy profits and a solid cash flow tend to invest more in 
R&D than those facing economic constraints.
13 A policy mix directed at addressing these 
market failures might therefore significantly improve the effectiveness of R&D. Such a policy 
mix could consist of increased financial resources provided by banks, guarantees for the 
protection of innovation (e.g. patent laws), support for cooperation and research joint ventures, 
broader diffusion of information on a national and international scale, improvements in basic 
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learning and innovation (e.g. increased interaction between universities and applied research) 
and technology diffusion via firm-level cooperation agreements.  
4.2.2  Prioritising technologies 
Irrespective of whether governments focus on option 1 or 2, the question of how to define 
research priorities remains important. Although new areas such as renewables or hydrogen 
rightly attract a lot of attention, there is a risk that the potential of existing technologies will be 
overlooked. For example, recent technological developments suggest that the efficiency of the 
conventional combustion engine in cars can still be improved by over 40%. Considerable 
potential exists as well in other parts of the energy chain including technological advances in 
transmission and distribution. Of particular importance is the development of the power grid 
capable of collecting electricity produced from decentralised sources. Substantial improvements 
are possible for gas turbines, which will remain the critical part of power generation but also 
other fossil fuel technologies, such as steam power plants or so-called “clean coal technologies”. 
Improvements can also be achieved in construction and many electrical goods. A striking 
example for improvements already achieved is the oil and gas upstream business. Deep-water 
technology has improved to such an extent that the depth at which deep-water production is 
possible has been increased by a factor of ten in the last 20 years, from 200 to 2,000 metres. At 
the same time the recovery rate has risen from 30 to 50%. This suggests that research support 
should in principle be provided to all areas of the energy chain including, in addition to 
renewables, transmission and distribution as well as conventional energies.  
4.3  Public opinion and large investments 
Any kind of major investment project, regardless of the sector involved, increasingly faces 
public opposition in the EU. Such opposition is less a result of liberalisation than of the 
development of the concept of civil society, which has become an integral and important part of 
modern democracy. It manifests itself, for example, in the direct participation of citizens in the 
decision-making process via elements of direct democracy (e.g. referendum), the rise of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and the increasing importance of public opinion in policy-
making.  
Opposition to n ew investment in itself is not a new phenomenon, even if it appears to be 
increasing. What is different, however, is that the risk of public opposition has a different effect 
on investment decisions in the new competitive market environment in which companies 
operate than it had during the era of monopolies. Within competitive markets, firms are 
“technology-neutral” and invest in those technologies that promise the highest long-term return 
on capital. Controversial technologies tend to reduce this return. F aced with almost certain 
public opposition against any major project, private companies will shy away from new 
investments if they judge the risk to be high – unless governments provide insurance. Prevailing 
negative public opinion represents economic, political and market risk. The economic risk arises 
from delays and measures to accommodate opposition that change the economics of the project. 
The political risk is that the government retreats from its original decision, a risk that is 
particularly high after a change of government. The market risk could involve the damage of a 
well established brand name in the face of sustained public opposition. The problem is that costs 
and benefits of such investments are unevenly distributed. 
Most of the energy sources face increased public opposition, one prominent example being 
nuclear energy  – both production and waste disposal. It is questionable whether private 
companies would today embark on a nuclear strategy given the unknown inherent political 
risks. But nuclear energy, despite widespread acceptance in France and the Czech Republic, is 
not the only controversial technology. LNG terminals encounter strong opposition in Italy, 
while in Norway and Switzerland, large hydro power plants increasingly provoke protests. In SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY 
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Germany there is opposition against open coal mining, and in Sweden, Vattenfall had to 
abandon the construction of a gas-fired power plant. In the Netherlands, it is increasingly 
difficult to build wind parks or explore for oil or gas. In general, there are objections to heat 
production from waste. Even more important, it appears to be virtually impossible to build 
overhead transmission lines in the more populated areas of the EU, where they are often 
opposed on grounds of health (owing to electromagnetic fears), the visual impact or the 
detrimental effect on flora and fauna. By contrast, it is worth noting that there are no public 
objections to encouraging investments in energy efficiency. One must ask the question whether 
this public opposition is justified. The potential incapacity to produce sufficient quantities of 
fuel or to deliver energy to consumers resulting from the prevalence of unwarranted public 
opinion against new investment constitutes a major, if not the greatest security-of-supply risk 
posed today.
14  
The increasing importance of public opinion obliges governments and firms to ensure that 
sufficient analysis is undertaken regarding potential health, environmental or other concerns 
related to large investment projects. There is also a need for better justification of projects, 
which could be done through information campaigns and transparent consultation procedures 
that facilitate full public participation. Such procedures should fulfil clearly laid out criteria, and 
in turn the relevant authorities should ensure that the planning procedure is efficient and 
streamlined. 
                                                 
14 Not to mention the fact that constraints on building new generation capacity or networks will 
undermine competition in the EU internal energy market.   
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CHAPTER 5 
OPTIMISATION OF SUPPLY: A SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 
 
hereas the previous chapter concentrated on horizontal aspects, this chapter focuses 
on sector-specific issues related to supply. A distinction is drawn between primary 
and secondary fuels, i.e. electricity and hydrogen. Secondary fuels pose some of the 
most important challenges to security of supply in liberalised energy markets today. 
5.1  Primary fuels 
Security-of-supply issues related to traditional primary fuels are well known. In the case of oil 
and gas, the questions are associated with geopolitics, investment and market developments, 
whereas in the case of coal and renewables, they relate to the environment and subsidies.  
5.1.1  Oil and gas 
The point of departure for the analysis of both long- and short-term security of supply of oil and 
gas is the assumption that both fuels will be available in sufficient quantities to meet demand in 
the long-term. Proven oil reserves continue to grow, as does the trend of new discoveries. 
Conventional proven oil reserves are currently about 45 years, but this figure is expected to 
increase with improvements in the recovery factor – the amount of oil that can be recovered 
from reservoirs. Thanks largely to improvements in exploration technologies and extraction 
methods, the recovery rate rose from 30 to 50% between 1985 and 1995, and the rate is 
expected to continue to improve beyond 2020. The long-term prospects for oil production look 
to so-called non-conventional oil reserves – such as tar sands, oil shale, heavy oil and bitumen –
whose known volumes are effectively unlimited. With the exception of tar sands, which are 
quickly becoming competitive, the economic cost of recovering this oil is currently very high, 
and the environmental costs, especially taking into account a possible constraint on greenhouse-
gas emissions, could make such non-conventional production prohibitively expensive in the 
long term. From a security-of-supply point of view, a shift to non-conventional oil production 
would be beneficial because these resources are widely dispersed across the world. 
Similarly, there is enough gas around Europe to satisfy an annual 3% growth in demand. Europe 
is surrounded by sufficient primary energy and possesses the technologies needed to produce it. 
Estimates of conventional gas resources suggest that there will be ample resources to support 
the projected growth in consumption until at least 2020 and probably for some time beyond. For 
several years, the reserves-to-production ratio has remained relatively stable at 20 years, despite 
rising production. But production over probable reserves is estimated at 120 years. Methane 
hydrates are thought to be an abundant long-term source of natural gas, but their exploitation is 
problematic and creates the risk of possible leakage of this important greenhouse gas (European 
Commission, 2000b, p. 56). 
In the short term, Algeria and Russia will remain the main external sources for natural gas. 
Other sources such as Nigeria, Libya, Trinidad, Tobago, UAE and Qatar so far have played only 
a supplementary role due to the high transport cost of natural gas, which works out to be 
between four and ten times higher than for crude oil. The high transport cost combined with the 
lack of market liquidity have made it uneconomical to transport natural gas over very long 
distances, thereby hampering the development of a fully global natural gas market. Instead, 
three distinct markets exist: Europe, the US and Japan/Pacific. Increasingly, however, these 
markets are gradually being linked by liquefied natural gas (LNG).  
The main issue for oil and gas therefore is not so much the availability of reserves as ensuring 
that sufficient funds are invested to develop and physically deliver the necessary oil and gas to 
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the market. Security-of-supply issues boil down to diversification, consumer/producer dialogue, 
market functioning and the investment climate both upstream and downstream. 
 
Oil  
Global investment in oil is projected to be in the magnitude of $100 billion per annum from now 
to 2010, reflecting an annual production growth of approximately 7%. Such investment will 
only materialise in a functioning market.
15 With an average lead time for a project of seven to 
eight years and a project life span of several decades, there is an argument to be made for 
providing regulatory certainty.  
To mitigate long-term security risks, worldwide diversification is and will remain the classical 
tool to accompany a strategy aimed at improving relations with supplier countries. In Europe, 
the latter includes the EU-Russia energy dialogue, strengthened cooperation with other 
countries of the former Soviet Union, notably Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership. This cooperation should aim both at improving the political and 
economic relations and at facilitating improvements in the investment climate. In some cases, 
there are tensions between the EU domestic agenda and security-of-supply considerations. One 
example is destination clauses
16 in long-term contracts, which are incompatible with EC 
competition law but are insisted upon by some producers. Another example is high fossil fuel 
taxation, which is described by some producer countries as a means to retain the economic rent 
                                                 
15 The functioning of the market is reflected by price volatility. Thus, price spikes (as well as troughs) are 
part of the normal pattern of the market.  
16 Destination clauses are contractual provisions demanded by suppliers that natural gas cannot be sold in 
any other market than the one specified to avoid the gas being sold to another country where gas prices 
are higher (as long as there is limited cross-border competition). 
Box 2. The difference between proven reserves and probable resources 
 
OECD Europe proven gas reserves and undiscovered resources (Gm3)  
 
 
Proven reserves  
(at 1/1/2000) 
Undiscovered gas 
resources (mean, at 
1/1/1996)  
Netherlands  1 714   242  
Norway  3 808   5 180  
United Kingdom  760   662  
Others   872  4 647 
   Total   7 154  10 811 
For several years, the reserves-to-production ratio has been relatively stable at about 20 
years despite rising production – mostly in the North Sea. Estimates of reserves have been 
significantly revised upwards since the end of the 1980s, most often as a result of better 
assessments of existing fields. Geological knowledge of gas basins is well advanced in the 
region. It is estimated, however, that very significant gas potential still exists in the North 
Sea, in particular on the Norwegian continental shelf which has not been extensively 
explored. Cedigaz estimates remaining ultimate European gas resources at 13-16 Tm3. 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (2001a). EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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of oil. Thirdly, sanctions against producer countries for political reasons can undermine long-
term security of supply. 
Gas  
Security of supply in natural gas can be affected by both short- and long-term issues. Both areas 
have been influenced by the recent ongoing liberalisation in the EU.  
Short-term security of supply in gas  
Liberalisation can be expected to benefit short-term security of supply. Following liberalisation 
in the UK, for instance, security of supply improved due to new entrants, more efficient price 
signals in the market, a more efficient use of assets, better demand forecasts (which have 
become part of the entrepreneurial risk) and, generally, a better customer focus. Full market 
opening does not remove public service obligations on the part of govenrment. For example, the 
crucial elements for security of supply – meaning sufficient capacity and continuity of deliveries 
– are set as obligations on and incentives for the Transmission Systems Operators (TSOs). A 
general approach could entail making TSOs liable for non-delivery including compensation 
schemes,
17 which should create incentives for sufficient infrastructure-building. It is important 
that the costs for these rules are included in tariffs by the transmission companies, excluding the 
costs for failure to comply. TSOs should be able to recover costs that are incurred to meet 
agreed security-of-supply criteria, but should not recover those costs when they fail to meet the 
criteria or have to compensate consumers o r network users for disruption in supply. Such 
liability rules are equally important for domestic and industrial customers, and such obligations 
are usually part of the licencing or the regulatory process.  
Long-term security of supply 
One set of concerns raised by ong-term security of supply of gas is related to financing and 
investment. In the gas sector, considerable investment is needed for infrastructure, especially 
upstream.
18 Estimated investments in gas until 2020 amount to around €300 billion in total for 
Europe. Producers need to feel confident that they will be able to sell the gas on the wholesale 
markets and be provided with sufficiently clear market (price) signals to assess the economics of 
a potential project. Other elements favourable to upstream infrastructure investment include 
speedy planning and construction procedures but also sensible rules for access to upstream 
pipelines. Otherwise there is a danger that infrastructure investments will be deferred in 
liberalised markets, ultimately posing a risk that sufficient supply will not be available. Hence 
the first and most important issue in ensuring supply is to ensure that sufficient investment is 
made in production, transport and storage facilities. This can either be done via monopoly 
buyers or throughout a well established competitive market. A hybrid system could present the 
worst of both worlds, whereby investment risk could not be reasonably assessed or mitigated.  
The second set of concerns raised is strategic in nature, i.e. (political) problems resulting from 
the dependence on foreign sources of supply, i.e. Algeria and Russia. For this reason, 
diversification of gas sources is not possible to the same extent as it is for oil. A number of 
measures have been proposed that are likely to contribute to security of supply. Increasingly, 
such measures will have to be placed in the context of market dynamics. Measures could 
include specific targets, such as the ability to cope with six months’ disruption from any source. 
Most European countries have defined such targets and are able to cope with disruption of 
several months duration. The development of other infrastructure, such as storage and LNG, can 
                                                 
17 Such rules are in place in several countries, including Norway for electricity and the UK for gas and 
electricity. Compensation includes damages for losses. 
18 Possible development projects include additional infrastructure in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, 
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provide alternative sources of supply in case of disruptions. International agreements such as the 
Energy Charter Treaty (see CEPS, 1996) or the EU-Russian energy partnership could be useful 
in providing an umbrella under which companies can internationally trade and invest. In 
addition, they facilitate constructive cooperation between importing and exporting countries, as 
well as transit countries, due to shared supplier/user concerns over the level and non-versatility 
of infrastructure investments. Barriers, such as fiscal obstacles or public opinion to the 
development of indigenous resources, should be addressed.  
5.1.2  Coal 
As the European Commission’s Green Paper on security of supply states in referring to hard 
coal, the “production of coal on the basis of economic criteria has no prospect either in the EU 
or in applicant countries. Its future can only be maintained within the framework of the 
European Union’s security of supply” (p. 38). As the Green Paper also acknowledges, the 
flexibility in (hard) coal contracts and the development of a spot market are a sign of efficiently 
functioning world markets. As a result of market functioning and the lack of political risk, coal 
supply are secure and appear not to need any particular insurance such as maintaining minimum 
access to reserves.
19 Similarly, there are no major political risks associated with the physical 
availability of lignite, which is a domestic non-traded commodity. 
The constraints that coal faces are related to cost and its environmental consequences. How 
these constraints will play out in the future will depend on technological developments (e.g. 
“clean coal” technology, carbon scrubbing, efficiency improvements in coal-fired power 
stations) that will reduce the environmental impact and the economic efficiency of coal burning. 
The other major factor influencing the future of coal is price, which is related to obligations to 
use domestic vs. imported coal and to fluctuations in the price of gas. 
5.1.3  Nuclear and uranium 
Security of supply is one of the ostensible reasons for renewed interest in nuclear power.
20 
Sometimes nuclear is also brought into the debate as a means to hedge against primary energy 
price rises, or at least as a way to cope with volatile global energy markets. There are however 
risks related to political acceptability, commercial viability and environmental health and safety, 
including the risk or perceived risk of terrorist attacks.
21  
Whether new investment in nuclear power will play a role as insurance against supply risks 
depends on how investors, p ossibly together with governments, judge the balance between 
supply risks and other risks associated with nuclear. It also depends on whether governments 
decide to reinsure or fully assume liability for political acceptability and risks in case of terrorist 
attacks. This balance could change if other considerations, such as climate change, are added to 
the equation. 
The likelihood of a nuclear revival for security-of-supply reasons to a large extent depends on 
whether one assumes that import dependency is a  problem. As stated above, this is not 
necessarily the case as long as sources are sufficiently diversified. Nevertheless, nuclear energy 
                                                 
19 A call for a 15% set-aside from the liberalised market for domestic fuels, or an extension of subsidies to 
the coal industry on the basis of security of supply, seems to be unwarranted. 
20 European Commission (2000a) and International Energy Agency (2001b). 
21 An example of the sensitivity of nuclear power to this risk of public disapproval is the Irish 
government’s reaction in October 2001 to the expansion of the UK Sellafield nuclear power plant: Joe 
Jacob, the Irish minister in charge of nuclear safety, was quoted in Reuters, 4 October 2001, as describing 
the approval of the MOX facility as “highly irresponsible” given the current political climate and the risks 
posed by terrorism, while the Prime Minister announced Ireland’s intention to bring the matter to the 
European Court of Justice and the United Nations.  EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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is a potential asset in a risk-management strategy for three reasons. First, it is part of a 
diversification strategy, which could reduce supply risks. Second, although the EU depends 
100% on imported uranium, uranium is readily available and cheap and can be stockpiled. There 
are currently relatively few political or economic supply risks associated with uranium, although 
public opposition to mining is increasing, and supplies of ore are diminishing – but only to a 
significant level beyond the 2020 time horizon. Thirdly, it is CO2-neutral.  
There is some renewed interest in nuclear, not least due to the fact that nuclear energy does not 
emit greenhouse gases. This interest has taken several forms including the US energy plan, the 
possibility of a fifth reactor in Finland, the renewed UK discussion and the debate launched in 
the Green Paper. Nevertheless, no new reactor has been licensed to date. In Finland the request 
to build a fifth nuclear unit is scheduled to be examined by the national parliament before 
summer 2002. Should the parliament approve, the Finnish government will issue the license 
opening the way for construction. Although Finland’s discussion on whether to build a new 
reactor is an interesting illustration of the relationship between nuclear power and security of 
supply, the country’s situation might be atypical. Finland has to meet its Kyoto target in an 
environment where power generation relies heavily on coal, where existing biomass potential 
has been utilised and where further dependence on Russian gas is regarded as unacceptable for 
historical and geopolitical reasons. 
The crucial difference in the new nuclear debate is that it can no longer be portrayed as a 
confrontation between energy supply companies and the public. In a liberalised market, energy 
companies await guidance and decisions by the government on whether nuclear energy should 
play a role in the energy mix. If governments want nuclear to play a role, it either needs to be 
economical and commercially viable (including publicly acceptable) or governments need to 
take a pro-active stance within the boundaries of EU internal market and state aid rules.  
5.1.4  Renewables  
The potential contribution of renewable energy sources to Europe’s energy needs beyond 2020 
is difficult to predict, but there is no doubt that the sector has great promise. Biomass could 
provide a low-cost fuel, but its development depends on the availability of land and is affected 
by competition for land use for food production. Wind power holds promise for continuous 
growth beyond 2020, but it will require cost-effective energy storage technologies to allow its 
larger integration into networks. Solar, geothermal, small hydropower and ocean energy are all 
potential future energy sources but require technological advances. Hydrogen, as an energy 
carrier, has unlimited potential theoretically to supply future energy needs, but the cost-effective 
production of hydrogen from renewable sources – which for environmental reasons is the best 
alternative – has not yet been accomplished. For this reason and owing to the considerable 
necessary investment in a hydrogen infrastructure, the arrival of a hydrogen energy system 
seems to be a long-term and rather distant prospect. 
Renewables can be produced indigenously in Europe and therefore do not constitute a risk as 
regards physical availability. Of equal importance, renewables contribute to the diversification 
of energy supply sources, which is vital to increasing energy supply security. Even potential 
shares of 5%, such as is projected for biofuels in the transport fuel sector, contribute to this 
diversification and justify temporary fiscal measures for their promotion. The crucial element in 
the relationship between renewables and security of supply is price. To recall the CEPS 
definition, security of supply incorporates both physical availability and price. The main issue is 
therefore the subsidy system for renewables that is put in place, given that it is acknowledged 
that renewables should temporarily be supported, mainly for environmental reasons. 
The need for subsidies for renewables is artificially increased further due to the existence of 
historical subsidies to other fuels such as nuclear and direct subsidies to coal. Conversely, 
subsidies could potentially be lowered if the external costs of competing fuels were fully SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY 
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incorporated. In the case of biofuels, it will be necessary to allow EU member states to reduce 
excise duties on pure or blended biofuel or to further increase the high excise duties on 
conventional fuels in order to promote alternative fuels.
22 The role of renewables with regard to 
security of supply and the environment will largely depend on EU policy regarding subsidies as 
laid out in the European Commission’s state aid guidelines, (European Commission, 2001b, pp. 
3-15), which set the limits for future member state aid in an increasingly competitive market.  
Support for renewables for power generation in most countries is currently directly linked to 
prices, for example through feed-in laws. This has the effect that electricity consumers (in the 
end) will pay for what could be seen as a public good, the environment. In addition, feed-in 
laws tend to perpetuate subsidies to existing installations. There are signs that support via feed-
in may gradually be reduced. For example, Denmark is switching from its price support system 
for wind energy to a domestic green credit, or certificate, trading system, which will also allow 
it to participate in a European-wide credit trading system when that is established (American 
Wind Energy Association, 2001). The European Commission’s future stance on direct price 
support will be the main d eterminant, however. The European Court of Justice’s decision in 
March 2001 in favour of the German federal feed-in law seems to permit this form of support 
for the immediate future, although it remains to be seen whether such laws will be compatible 
with a fully liberalised internal energy market.
23  
In principle, renewables support could be de-linked from energy prices to end consumers. This 
could be done via subsidies from the public budgets. Such an approach would have to be 
compatible with EU internal market and state aid rules, however.
24 In addition, the funds would 
either have to be raised via extra taxes (whether earmarked or not) or savings on other budgetary 
expenditures, which is difficult in times of budgetary consolidation. Another possibility is the 
scheme for green certificates, which are fully tradable. Although internal-market compatible, 
green certificates nevertheless still have a price-effect and thereby increase energy prices. Such 
price increases, however, should be lower than in other schemes through higher efficiency as a 
consequence of the equalisation of the marginal costs.
25  
Renewables, which are basically produced in a decentralised way (with some exceptions such as 
large wind farms, large hydro or solar-thermal), have a number of impacts on the way the grid 
operates. These issues are discussed in the next section dealing with security of supply and 
electricity. This is only true however for renewable energy sources in power production. A 
number of EU member states use renewables for heat production or as transport fuels.  
5.2  The specific case of electricity  
Liberalisation has heightened the interest in security-of-supply issues in the electricity sector, 
notably in the aftermath of recent events, such as the California power crisis, temporary 
electricity shortages in the Nordic power market in the winter of 2000 and the power failures 
that occurred in many parts of the EU as a result of the heavy storms around Christmas 1999. 
Although the cause in each case was very different, all of them highlight the fact that power 
supply can eventually fail, i.e. that security of supply is a real ongoing concern. As the 
periodical  European Gas Markets reported in its October 2001 issue, “Ireland faces energy 
shortages this winter as the gas and power industries struggle to keep up with rapidly increasing 
demand.” 
                                                 
22 See “Brussels puts forward biofuel plans for roads”, Financial Times, 8 November 2001. 
23 Reuters, 15 March 2001; ECJ case C-379/98. 
24 According to the state aid rules, paragraph 24, member states are allowed to promote renewables and 
CHP (combined heat and power) through state aid where such aid is not in breach of other provisions of 
the Treaty or secondary legislation. 
25 See www.recs.org; Bräuer et al. (2000). EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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The Californian power crisis was special in that it was due at least in part to mishandled 
regulation. One should also add that the Californian situation is different from the European 
Union market in many respects. The EU for example does not foresee an obligatory pool 
(except for Italy) or prohibit bilateral agreements that allow companies to hedge their risks. A 
second set of issues relates to the absence of tendering for new capacity and planning rules for 
new capacity, which on average lasts for seven years. In addition, there was no internal US 
energy market, and trading arrangements were largely absent.
26 The new Commission 
liberalisation package aimed at further opening up the electricity (and gas) sector, including 
facilitating cross-border trade, should therefore be seen as potentially beneficial to security of 
supply. The electricity shortages in the Nordic power market (Nordel) were caused by a lack of 
peak capacity. Finally, the p ower cuts that occurred mainly in France during Christmas 1999 
point to the vulnerability of centralised power systems.  
Most of Europe is in a comfortable position for the time being, given that there is considerable 
over-capacity in generation, thus making the problems of both California and Nordel appear 
unlikely at least for the moment. Additional measures are currently being taken by the European 
Commission to improve security of supply. These include the monitoring of generation capacity 
and interconnections, the progressive implementation of the internal energy market to enhance 
trading as well as the harmonisation of networks and security standards (e.g. public service 
obligations). Finally, the European Commission’s new liberalisation proposal also  foresees 
tendering possibilities where additional generation capacity is needed. 
5.2.1  Reserve capacity 
In the monopolised market structure, capacity shortages were never a problem. The system was 
inherently producing overcapacity in the knowledge that costs could easily be passed on to 
consumers. Additional safety margins were possible “just in case” since they did not entail a 
business risk. In many countries regional or local monopolies considered it prestigious to own 
generation capacity. The obvious downside was high costs. In competitive markets the situation 
has reversed. Investment decisions for generation capacity are based on calculations of 
profitability. Particularly if peak demand is only seldomly reached, which by definition is the 
case for the marginal KWh, incentives to build reserve capacity are low. There is a difference 
between electricity and other markets because electricity cannot be stored. This has been 
witnessed in the hydro-dominated Nordel market, where in February 2001 the peak load 
capacity was tested. The result was that the capacity was not sufficient to meet peak demand. 
The question is whether a similar situation could arise in part of or across the EU.  
Peak-load capacity is not a problem at the EU aggregate level. However, due to the 
fragmentation of the internal electricity market and a lack of cross-border trade or even unused 
cross-border interconnection capacity, the aggregate figure is largely irrelevant. Relevant 
reference points are regional trading areas. Table 3 demonstrates that Ireland, Nordel and 
Greece in particular have very little spare capacity to deal with peak load. Nordel is especially 
vulnerable with a high share of hydroelectric power (see Table 4).  
Theoretically, shortages of generation capacity could be  offset via trade. However, 
interconnection capacity is generally insufficient and where it is sizeable such as in the case of 
France and Italy, it is linked to regular imports, i.e. not available for dealing with peak-load 
problems. In addition there might be internal bottlenecks such as in the case of former East 
Germany, which rules out imports from Poland, for example. 
 
 
                                                 
26  Although EU trade is partially also inhibited due to a lack of transparency as well as a lack of 
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Table 3. Remaining capacity at peak load  
 
Country/region 
Percentage remaining capacity at peak load 
of national generating power capacity 
Ireland  0% 
Nordel  1% 
Greece   2% 
England & Wales  3% 
Iberian peninsula   4% 
Continental Europe  4% 
Italy   6% 
Centrel (Central and Eastern Europe)  13% 
Scotland  22% 
Note: Data for January 2001. 
Source: UCTE. 
 
Table 4. Comparing installed capacity across several regions in the US and the EU  
  California  PJM*  Iberian 
peninsula 
Italy  UK  Scandinavia 
(S,N,FI) 
Core 
Europe 
Installed capacity  
(1998, in GW) 
52.3  57  60.3  72.5  73  75.4  296.4 
Increase 90-98 
Average/year  -0.6%  1.2%  2.3%  3.2%  -0.1%  0.5%  1.4% 
Share of hydro  25.8%  5.0%  31.2%  27.7%  5.9%  61.3%  20.0% 
Peak/installed  
capacity**  85%  85%  63%  64%  83%  76%  66% 
* PJM = Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, an electricity trading zone. 
** The ratio of peak and installed capacity alone is not sufficient to judge the potential risks of a 
lack of actually available peak capacity. One of the crucial factors for judging the level of risk that 
an area is exposed to is the level of hydro, which depends on weather conditions (i.e. rain). Given 
that the share of hydro is particularly high in Scandinavia (e.g. ten-fold that of the UK), the situation 
of the Nordic countries is more problematic than appears at first glance. 
Source: CEPS Working Party. 
 
Under certain conditions, competitive markets can lead to an erosion of reserve capacity. This is 
at least what the Nordic evidence suggests. This does not need to be the case, however, as was 
shown in England and Wales – although there are important differences between the two 
regions. The Nordic countries rely to a far bigger extent on hydro than England and Wales (61% 
vs. 6%), which traditionally is a less reliable source than thermal capacity. In addition, Nordic 
electricity prices have fallen to the level of – and sometimes even below – short-term marginal 
costs, which has eroded incentives to build new capacity. This was not the case in England and 
Wales partly due the generation oligopoly, reinforced via the mandatory pool. As a result 
electricity prices did not fall to short-term marginal costs. In principle, though, concentration EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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should be detrimental to security of supply. Especially where generation is oligopolistic – which 
is the case for most member state markets – there are strong incentives to keep reserve capacity 
small. It was said that market power of generators was another factor that contributed to the 
California crisis. Market power is especially damaging to security of supply if peak capacity 
(such as pumped storage, which has a fast reaction time) is monopolised. Further liberalisation 
to speed up import competition to challenge the dominant generators should reduce this risk. 
Market liberalisation also gives large customers the possibility of offering frequency response 
and standing reserve services, as well as demand-side management; these all contribute to 
reinforcing the integrity of supply at times of peak demand. 
In the meantime Nordic countries consider tendering for peak capacity, in line with a similar 
provision (Art. 6) foreseen in the new Commission proposal to accelerate liberalisation.
27 The 
Commission realises that if under certain conditions, on economic considerations alone, peak 
capacity would not be built, some financial incentive will need to be associated with new peak-
load capacity. To apply the CEPS insurance approach, the incentive should equal the insurance 
premium for security of supply. The insurance premium could also be built into pricing, i.e. 
end-use prices or network access prices. 
The option should be tested economically against providing such insurance by better energy 
efficiency. The issue of reserve capacity could also be approached via the demand side, i.e. by 
flattening the peaks. If the actual demand comes close to the peak, new capacity becomes more 
economical, but if the peak is only reached once a year, the marginal units do not pay off and 
will be closed eventually. To flatten peaks, connection charges to customers could be linked to 
the fuse (i.e. the size of the cable), which determines the maximum capacity at which a 
customer can draw on the grid and therefore the profile of peaks. Such an approach would at the 
same time provide incentives to reduce peak load while receipts from connection charges could 
be used to fund marginal or reserve capacity.  
5.2.2  Pressures on the transmission grid  
Separation of generation, supply and distribution (i.e. unbundling) has also changed 
responsibilities for the security of the transmission grid. Generators and suppliers as market 
participants are basically responsible for the short-, medium- and long-term balance between 
supply and demand. TSOs on the other hand are responsible for the safe and efficient operation 
of the transmission grid, which enables the market to work. This includes responsibility for 
ancillary services and the balancing market as well as facilitating the spot market. It also 
includes the long-term development of the transmission grid. Thus, the starting point is to 
provide sufficient obligations and incentives to TSOs to be able to undertake their tasks. It is the 
responsibility of government to design and implement the appropriate regulatory framework. 
TSOs face a number of challenges linked to security of supply. As a consequence of increasing 
international trade, there is a need for market-based congestion-management rules. With a 
greater number of market players, there is a need for appropriate ancillary-services 
specification, including enforceability rules and the definition of the relationship between power 
exchanges and TSOs. As was discussed in the previous chapter, there is increased pressure on 
the transmission system to bring in reserve capacity. 
The biggest risk for security of supply from a TSO perspective is the lack of public acceptance 
of new transmission grid construction. In most parts of Europe, notably in central and densely 
populated areas, it is virtually impossible to build new overhead lines. As a consequence, TSOs 
have to resort to installing underground cables, which are more expensive by a factor of 
between 10 to 30 in extreme cases. The risk originating from insufficient grid capacity  is 
                                                 
27 Proposal amending the directives on electricity (Directive 96/92/EC) and gas (Directive 98/30/3C). 
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significant. The costs of unserved energy are estimated to be at between 3-20 euro per KW and 
for short-term interruptions of under 15 minutes at between 1-100 euro per KW. The damage 
easily runs into the billions of euro (see Vandenberghe, 2001). 
Similar risks are associated with the medium and long-term. They include the following: 
a)  Different time horizons between planning of new generation (e.g. three years for Combined 
Cycle Gas Turbines) and network assets (e.g. typically 5-10 years). 
b)  Public acceptance of network construction. 
c)  Pressures from third countries (east and south) to be interconnected to the EU grid. Massive 
electricity trade could further increase pressure on grids.  
d)  The regulatory framework has to ensure a fair rate of return; this is particularly important in 
the light of higher costs of underground cables as compared to overhead lines. This 
framework should also include incentives to build power plants in proximity to energy 
consumption. 
These risks are mainly associated with government a ction. Except for the area of public 
acceptance of network construction (see Chapter 4.4, above), there is little that companies can 
do regarding different planning horizons or pressures to interconnect third countries to the grid. 
The question of a sensible regulatory framework is by definition the task of governments. 
5.2.3  Distributed generation 
Distributed generation is decentralised electricity generation from small-scale sources, 
especially combined heat and power (CHP), which are connected to the grid at the distribution 
rather than at the transmission level. The overall market share of CHP in the EU is still low, at 
10%. Nevertheless, the growth of distributed generation is supported by a number of long-term 
trends, including the demand for higher fuel efficiency caused by climate-change and other 
environmental policies, as well as pressures to increase economic efficiency due to 
liberalisation. Decentralised generation may also be driven by congestion problems in the cross-
border grid (“to have the plant on the right side of the congestion”). Distributed generation lends 
itself well to the use of natural gas, which is the fuel of choice in liberal markets, and 
renewables, which will benefit from government support. Finally, technological developments – 
including micro-turbines, Stirling engines (a type of clean, low-polluting engine) and fuel cells 
– will both increase the efficiency and tend to lead to decentralised solutions. The future energy 
landscape is likely to consist of traditional large-scale plants conbined with new decentralised 
approaches. Decentralised power production is likely to reach domestic scale within the next 
few years with units as small as 1 -5 Kw. Distributed generation also enables greater local 
involvement with and awareness of electricity issues. 
These developments have a number of implications for security of supply. At the general level, 
the existence of distributed generation adds another actor to the energy chain, which in turn 
increases the flexibility and thereby the security of supply. By bringing a new technology into 
play, the scope for innovation is increased. Decentralised systems may turn out to be “scalable”, 
i.e. additional capacity can be added if needed. This increases the system efficiency by reducing 
waste (e.g. capital costs). In principle, distributed generation contributes to reducing import 
dependency due to higher efficiency, which reduces energy demand. Distributed generation has 
one potential advantage compared to centralised power production and distribution, which is 
that it makes the system less vulnerable to damages due to heavy weather and storms. In light of 
the previous analysis, the most important advantages are the following: 
a)  Distributed generation increases the statistical reliability of the electricity system. 1000 
small generators are more unlikely to fail than one centralised unit. They are also less 
vulnerable to terrorism. Distributed generation could even be used as reserve capacity for EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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peak-load demand. A precondition is that issues of technical harmonisation and grid access 
are solved.  
b)  Decentralised generation will also reduce the pressures on grids, as was discussed in the 
previous section. Its most important contribution may be that it puts less strain on the 
highest voltage grids, which are the most expensive to put underground. 
It is clear that distributed generation will prevail in a liberal market and, as a complement to 
existing grid connections, it has a positive effect on security of supply. Its exact contribution, 
however, very m uch depends on how the interaction with the grid will be priced. Since cost 
characteristics of electricity distribution are such that they almost equal fixed costs – the 
variable part is losses – decentralised generators will face a difficult pricing structure. This 
could change if the positive effects of distributed generation can be accounted for. Should 
distributed generation become a mass phenomenon, back-up capacity will consist of 
decentralised generation capacity installed in households and in smaller sources. This will only 
be possible, however, if transmissions and distribution grids are technically adapted so as to be 
capable of collecting the electricity produced in decentralised modes.  
Thus, distributed generation could become an important part of the risk-management strategy to 
deal with security-of-supply risks in the electricity sector. Distributed generation is part of a 
technical solution to improve security of supply. If decentralised generation is a mass 
phenomenon, however, the distribution grid will need to be adapted and redeveloped in order to 
allow the technical issues to be settled.   
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CHAPTER 6 
PROPOSAL FOR AN EU INSURANCE POLICY TO MANAGE SUPPLY RISKS 
 
n applying the CEPS approach to security of supply, which is understood as insurance 
against supply risks, this final chapter draws conclusions from our analysis and proposes 
concrete recommendations for policy-makers.
28 
Liberalisation of energy markets and globalisation have changed the very nature of security of 
supply. In the past,  security of supply was mainly the responsibility of government, which 
delegated responsibilities to supply companies. In liberal energy markets, security of supply 
becomes a shared responsibility of governments, firms and customers. It is large industrial 
consumers in particular that are willing and able to cover their risks for security of supply. Since 
the level of security of supply is strongly related to energy prices, security-of-supply concerns 
are part of the commercial strategy of industrial consumers (Chapter 2.3). Many companies 
prefer to assume the risk themselves and benefit from lower prices or to set their own level of 
supply security.  
In order to facilitate the interaction between markets and government policy, CEPS proposes a 
new approach to security of supply. Security of supply becomes a risk-management strategy for 
all players in the energy market including government, companies and, directly or indirectly, all 
users (Chapter 2.1). Security of supply comprises two equally important parts:  physical 
availability of energy sources and the price element. Given that the level of energy prices 
crucially affects economic growth, wealth and the competitiveness of industries, price and 
physical availability are inextricably linked. 
The approach to security of supply cannot simply consist of putting a “policy” in place; market 
forces must at the same time be harnessed to improve supply security. In many cases, “policy” 
alone will not do the job and may be in tension with one of the constituent parts of security of 
supply, “price” (“policy tends to cost money”). As a first step, therefore, we have examined 
what role market forces can play. Our conclusion is that market forces can possibly play an even 
larger role than government policies.  
In order to apply the insurance concept, it is indispensable to identify the risks as well as the 
likelihood of their occurrence and their possible consequences (Chapter 2.2). This is attempted 
in itemised form in the table presented in Annex 1. In order to classify the various risk 
categories, we have borrowed the classification scheme applied in the European Commission’s 
Green Paper: technical, economic, political and environmental risks to security of supply. 
Analytically, we distinguish between short-term and long-term risks, a concept that is now 
widely used in the analysis of security of supply. The short-term concept describes risks that are 
associated with system failures such as (limited) supply interruptions due to lack of capacity, 
extreme weather conditions or accidents. The long-term notion implies supply risks associated 
with political (e.g. war, civil war or embargo) or economic (e.g. lack of investment with a 
resulting imbalance between supply and demand) risks. We acknowledge, however, that short- 
and long-term risks cannot always be disentangled, especially with regard to responses, e.g. 
risk-management strategies. 
Both technology development and energy efficiency are crucial for meeting the EU’s energy 
and environmental challenges, but their contribution to security of supply is indirect. 
Technological development will improve overall efficiency of the energy sector and reduce 
waste, thereby having a positive impact on the efficiency of markets. Energy efficiency by way 
of reducing demand increases the flexibility of the whole energy chain and therefore provides an 
                                                 
28 Note that the key messages have already been posted in the beginning of the report.  
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additional security margin. The detailed analysis can be found in Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 4, 
respectively.  
This report has not analysed in depth the consequences of the events of 11 September 2001 in 
the US. Since the risk of terrorist attacks of this magnitude was previously considered low, no 
insurance had been taken out. This will certainly change in the future and issues of security 
from terrorist attacks will play a more prominent role in considering security of energy supply. 
The most likely effect will be seen in higher insurance costs, which in their literal sense and in 
the CEPS concept will change the relative prices for different fuels and generation technologies. 
6.1  Priority for insurance against short-term risks 
Our analysis shows that the highest risks are associated with short-term security of supply. 
There are major risks associated with continuity and reliability of electricity supply (Chapter 
5.2) and to a lesser extent, of natural gas. Security of supply could also be undermined if 
unwarranted public opposition (Chapter 4.3) to necessary new investment projects prevails or if, 
for other reasons, energy installations such as refineries become the target for blockades. This is 
also confirmed by recent empirical evidence. Security-of-supply problems arose as a result of 
regulatory failure in California or a lack of reserve capacity and concern over high short-term 
electricity prices in Nordic countries (i.e. Nordel). Blockades of refineries and roads in the UK 
or elsewhere as a consequence of fuel price protests in Europe in the autumn of 2000 are 
another recent example. As a consequence, the following have been identified as the major 
concerns for security of supply.  
1)  Reserve capacity for power generation. Although Europe at present is in a comfortable 
position due to over-capacity in generation, liberalisation without a well thought-out 
regulatory framework might lead to a reduction in reserve capacity. This has been 
witnessed i n Nordel, but might occur elsewhere if there is a slow transition to fully 
competitive EU energy markets. One solution is to identify responsibilities for maintaining 
reserve capacity associated with market-based compensation schemes.
29 
2)  Network obligations in natural gas and electricity. One crucial element for security of 
supply are the obligations on and incentives of the network operator to maintain sufficient 
capacity. This could best be done via network-operator liability rules for network failure 
and t he ability of network operators to recover costs that are incurred to meet agreed 
security-of-supply criteria (Chapter 5.2). 
3)  Public opinion and new investment.  There is growing opposition to new investment 
including new generation capacity and grid development, notably overhead lines (Chapters 
4.3 and 5.2.). To minimise and manage the risks, there is a need for stronger justification of 
new projects, which could be done via information and transparent consultation procedures 
including full public participation. This is a role for firms and governments alike. 
Governments need to make sure that unwarranted public opposition to necessary new 
investment will not prevail or unnecessarily slow planning procedures. The need for new 
investment should be checked against the possibility to reduce demand. 
4)  Decentralised or distributed generation may have a positive effect on security of supply by 
increased flexibility, higher efficiency and the fact that decentralised systems are less 
vulnerable to heavy storms (such as those at Christmas 1999, in Europe) or terrorist attacks. 
At the same time, the development of distributed generation requires the technical 
redevelopment of the network as well as solutions to the cost of connecting to the network 
(5.2.3). Distributed generation for the time being will be mainly based on gas-fired sources. 
                                                 
29 In the UK, the pool-based compensation scheme for reserve peak capacity was discredited and has been 
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The consequent effect on long-term security of supply becomes closely linked to the 
security of gas supply. 
5)  Diversification, both by fuel and region, is a means to minimise risks associated with any 
specific fuel, be it gas or any other fuel. 
6.2  Priorities for insurance of long-term political and economic risks 
This report has also analysed the long-term risks to security of supply. The first point of 
departure is that import dependency  is neither necessarily a bad thing nor economically 
inefficient (Chapter 2) as long as the portfolio regarding both fuels and import regions is 
diversified. The second point of departure is that price volatility is not a supply “problem” but 
rather the opposite. Price volatility in a typical long-term business with long lead times from 
well development to actual physical delivery should be expected and is proof that markets work. 
Even if one does not share this point of view, the question is what governments can realistically 
do to influence world oil prices, which are still the reference point for fuel prices. The very 
limited medium-term effect on prices of the US release from the strategic stocks on 21 
September 2000 is a case in point. 
1)  Oil. Risks with oil are mainly associated with ensuring sufficient investment to develop and 
physically deliver the required oil to the markets in addition to coping with the political 
risks associated with supplier countries (e.g. Middle East, Algeria, Russia and the 
Caucasus). As a consequence the best insurance against supply risks appears to be 
diversification and enhanced attempts to improve international relations and the investment 
climate (Chapter 5.1.1). 
2)  Natural gas. Similar to oil, long-term security of supply of natural gas relates to investment 
and political risk. Considerable investment in infrastructure, especially upstream, storage 
and network interconnections is also needed in the gas sector. As a result, producers need 
confidence to be able to sell gas on proper wholesale markets and require sufficiently clear 
market (price) signals to assess the economics of a potential project. As liquid traded gas 
markets develop on mainland Europe and gas prices decouple (at times) from oil, then the 
investment signals for gas will become clearer. Other elements favourable to upstream 
infrastructure investment are speedy planning and construction procedures but also sensible 
rules for access to upstream pipelines. The first and most important issue in ensuring supply 
is to ensure that sufficient investment in production, transport and storage facilities is made. 
Regarding the political risks, a similar strategy to oil would be appropriate (Chapter 5.1.1). 
3)  Coal.  This fuel offers an opportunity to diversify fuel, which in turn enhances security of 
supply. The limiting factor of hard coal and lignite is price and its environmental impact, 
however. Whether it will be competitive depends on obligations to use domestic hard coal, 
the future of environmental regulation, particularly regarding CO2 emissions and 
development of gas prices (Chapter 5.1.2).  
4)  Nuclear energy. A potential asset in a risk-management strategy as part of diversification. It 
also has the advantages of producing virtually no CO2 emissions, and uranium, although 
entirely imported, is readily available and cheap, with few political or economic supply 
risks foreseen prior to 2020. There are, however, considerations related to public 
acceptability and environmental impacts, including a cost-effective solution to the issue of 
nuclear waste.  Managing these factors has a potentially negative effect on nuclear’s 
competitiveness and therefore may create tension with the second element of security of 
supply, i.e. price (5.1.3).  
5)  Renewables will enhance security of supply, p rovided the necessary measures are taken 
regarding the interaction with the grid. Renewables such as biomass will also play an 
important role in the future of Europe’s energy mix through decentralised heating and EGENHOFER AND LEGGE 
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transport (using biofuels). The contribution of renewables to security of supply is crucially 
constrained by their current high cost and the limits to their potential share in the overall 
energy mix. It is nevertheless acknowledged that renewables deserve temporary public 
support for environmental reasons (Chapter 5.1.4). The main issue therefore becomes the 
nature and provisions of any subsidy system for renewables that is put in place. 
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Annex 1. Classification of Security-of-Supply Risks in the EU: Illustrations by 
Sector (oil, gas, coal, nuclear, renewables and electricity) 
 
Price rise  Fuel affected    Classification  Event  Disruption 
Intern’l  Domestic 
Probability 
in 20 years 
Duration 
Oil  Gas  Coal  Nuclear  RES  Elec- 
triciy 
Political risks 
1  Export embargo  Embargo of specific 
exporter (e.g. Iraq) 
Little  Little  Little  High  Months, 
years 
3  3         
2  Output 
reduction 
Quotas on production 
to raise prices (e.g. 
OPEC cartel) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  High  Months, 
years 
3          3 
3  Local market 
disruption I 
By pressure groups 
(e.g. fuel price 
protest)  
Yes    Yes   Medium-
high 
Weeks, 
months 
3          3 
4 
Local market 
disruption II 
Regulatory 
shortcomings (e.g. 
California power 
crisis, Nordic market)  
Yes  No  Yes  Medium-
high 
Weeks, 
months 
          3 
5  International 
market 
disruption 
Regulatory failure, 
e.g. regulation, 
competition, financial 
markets 
Yes  Yes (or 
rationing) 
Yes   Medium  Weeks, 
months, 
years 
3  3        3 
6 
Force majeure 
Civil unrest, war, 
deliberate blockage 
of trade routes,  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Low-
medium  
Variable  3  3         
7 
Import embargo  
Embargo of 
importing state by 
export or transit 
country (e.g. gas cut 
off ) 
Yes  No  Yes  Very low for 
EU 
Months, 
years 
  3?          
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Economic risks 
8  Public opinion 
on large-scale 
investment 
Delay in planning, 
under-investment 
Yes  No  Yes  High  Years  3  3  3  3  3  3 
9  Supply 
discontinuity 
Lack of infrastructure  Yes  Yes  Yes  Low-
medium  
Months, 
years 
3  3        3 
10  Production 
discontinuity 
Shortage of 
production capacity 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Low  years  3  3        3 
Environmental risks* 
11a  Major oil spill (land 
and sea) 
No  Yes  Yes  Medium  Weeks, 
months 
3           
11b  Major nuclear 
accident 
Yes  No  Yes  Low  Months, 
years 
      3    3 
11c 
Accident 
Burst of major gas 
pipeline  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Low  Weeks, 
months 
3  3        3 
12  Disruption/ 
destruction of 
habitat  
 
a)  Massive biomass 
plantations  
b)  Ultrasonic waves 
(of windturbines)  
Yes  No  Yes  High  Months, 
years 
           
12 
Run-away 
greenhouse 
effect  
Positive feed-back in 
bio-sphere (e.g. 
melting of 
permafrost) 
 
Yes  No     Very low  Perm’t/ 
irreversible  
3  3  3    3  3 
Technical risks 
13 
System failure 
Technical failure, e.g. 
due to extreme 
weather condition, 
technical neglect 
No  No  Yes  Medium  Days, 
weeks 
  3        3 
* Environmental risks are risks to supply only in an indirect way. Risks from accidents or other environmental 
dangers are related to subsequent government action, which might act as a dampener to investment and therefore 
create bottlenecks. Strictly speaking, environmental risks could also be listed under political risks. 
Source: Adapted from Andrews-Speed et al. (2001).  
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